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ABSTRACT
An HIV epidemic threatens injecting drug users in Kabul, Afghanistan. Although opioid
substitution therapy (OST) has been proven to reduce the spread of HIV and decrease injecting
drug use in many parts of the world, including on a small scale in Afghanistan, political obstacles
suggest that at this time it may not be a viable intervention there. In this thesis, therefore, I assess
the feasibility of implementing an alternative to OST as an HIV-prevention strategy, namely, a
non-OST route-transition intervention (RTI) designed to encourage and enable opiate users to
switch from injecting to smoking (also called chasing). Based on semi-structured interviews and
a focus-group discussion with drug-related institutional stakeholders in Kabul—including harm
reduction professionals, treatment providers, public health officials, and police officers—I
describe the perceived obstacles to, as well as facilitators and benefits of, harm reduction in
general and RTI in particular. Most participants supported the RTI concept and believed that it
would be feasible to implement such a program provided that doing so included educating
communities and stakeholders about harm reduction and the harms of drug use, building
cooperative alliances with them, and involving them in the planning process. Many also stressed
the importance of incorporating a sanctioned place for opiate smoking into an RTI program. RTI
appears to be a promising component of efforts to address the emerging concentrated HIV
epidemic in Kabul and prevent its further spread, but it is not free of significant challenges. I
discuss these and suggest potential ways of overcoming some of them.
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INTRODUCTION
An explosive HIV epidemic threatens injecting drug users (IDUs) in Kabul1, Afghanistan
(MoPH 2014), and by extension potentially the general population (Des Jarlais et al. 2012).
Although opioid substitution therapy (OST) has been proven to reduce the spread of HIV and
decrease injecting drug use in many parts of the world, including on a small scale in Afghanistan,
political obstacles suggest that at this time it may not be a viable intervention there. This thesis,
therefore, assesses the feasibility of implementing an alternative to OST as an HIV-prevention
strategy, namely, a non-OST route-transition intervention (RTI) designed to encourage and
enable opiate users to switch from injecting to smoking (also called chasing).
The emergence of an HIV epidemic in Afghanistan—along with the country’s massive
illicit drug economy (McCoy 2010; UNODC 2013a, 2014a), high level of problem drug use
(MacDonald 2007; UNODC 2009), and widespread psychological distress and social suffering
(Cardozo et al. 2004; Eggerman and Panter-Brick 2010; Panter-Brick et al. 2009; Scholte et al.
2004)—is the accomplishment2 (Reinarman 2005) of decades of imperial and civil war,
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And even more so IDUs in Herat City, where HIV prevalence (13.3%-18.4%) has consistently, since
2009, been much higher than that in Kabul City (2.1%-3.2%) (MoPH 2010, 2014; Ruiseñor-Escudero et
al. 2014; Todd et al. 2007b, 2011).
2
“Consequence” is the conventional term, but I use “accomplishment” for two reasons. First, I use it
simply to engage with and make a connection to other scholarship. In this case, I am drawing not so much
on the substance of Reinarman’s (2005) article, which deals with the historical social construction of the
disease concept of addiction, as on its title (“Addiction as Accomplishment”) and the concept behind the
word “accomplishment.” Second, and more importantly, a “consequence” can be the result of blind,
unagentive, passive forces. Like the passive voice—“People were killed,” “Workers’ wages were cut,”
“The population was displaced,” etc.—it can frame actions and results as simply happening, “naturally,”
attributable to no responsible subject. By contrast, to say that something is an “accomplishment” implies
that some rational, active, moral agent (a person, government, polity, organization, etc.) has wrought
something (good or bad) and that that agent can be identified and held accountable (or praised, as the case
may be) for what it has accomplished. My claim, then, is that many of Afghanistan’s ills (e.g., its narcoeconomy, high rates of problem drug use, and rising HIV rates) are not merely consequences. They are
the accomplishment of historical political and economic actors and thus have an inescapable political and
moral dimension to them, which to my mind “accomplishment” makes explicit. This is what I take
Schwalbe (2008:36) to mean when he says that “inequality is an accomplishment.” “It doesn’t just
happen,” he says, “like the wind or the rain; it happens because of how people think and act.”
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geopolitical rivalry, military occupation, US strategic support for drug traffickers (Klassen and
Albo 2013; Mercille 2013; Niland 2011), decimation of infrastructure and agriculture (McCoy
2010), widespread extreme poverty (Ruttig 2013; World Bank 2010), pervasive violence and
insecurity (MSF 2014; Oxfam 2009), large-scale human displacement (Costs of War Project
2014; UNHCR 2015), and the imposition of an undemocratic warlord state that has subordinated
human development to the interests of western powers, foreign capital, and local elites (Klassen
and Albo 2013; Mercille 2013; Niland 2011). Given such a risk environment (Rhodes 2002) and
evidence from similar contexts (Friedman et al. 2009; Hankins et al. 2002; Mock et al. 2004;
Rhodes and Simic 2005; Rhodes et al. 2005; Spiegel 2004; Strathdee et al. 2006), it is
unsurprising that “many Afghans seem to be taking drugs as a kind of self-medication against the
hardships of life” and that, as a result, HIV infection is on the rise in Afghanistan (UNODC
2009).
UNODC (2009) estimates there are approximately one million adults (15-64 years) who
use drugs regularly in Afghanistan, representing about 8% of the adult population. A more recent
survey by the US Department of State (DOS 2012) suggests there could be at least 1.3 million
adult drug users and about 300,000 children affected by drug use.3 Not only are these numbers
3

But some comparisons are necessary to guard against distorting the meaning and significance of these
numbers. For example, UNODC (2009) reports that 8% of adults in Afghanistan use illicit drugs regularly
and that this is twice the global average. But the numbers are similar for the US: 9.2% of Americans aged
12 and older reported having used an illicit drug (or used a licit one non-medically) in the last month in
2012 (NIDA 2014). The US State Department (DOS 2012) estimates that 2.6% of the urban population in
Afghanistan uses opioids (defined as morphine, codeine, heroin, and synthetic pharmaceutical opioids).
The World Drug Report 2014 (UNODC 2014c:28) cites this statistic, calling it “high (in comparison with
other countries).” And it is high compared to the global average (.7%), but it is not high compared to
North America’s 4.3% (22). The report also notes that opioid use has increased globally over the last year
and that most of that increase has been in the US (22), which trails only Canada (812.1855 ME mg) in its
per capita consumption (749.7859 ME mg) of opioids for medical purposes (30), dwarfing such
consumption in countries like Afghanistan (.3909 ME mg) (University of Wisconsin 2014).The State
Department (DOS 2012) also estimates that 5.3% of the urban population and 4%-5% of the total
population of Afghanistan uses drugs (defined as amphetamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines,
cannabinoids, alcohol, and opioids). But as noted above, 9.2% of Americans use illicit drugs alone (NIDA
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high, but they also represent a trend of dramatic increase in drug use. From 2005 to 2009, the
number of regular opium users increased by approximately 53%, from 150,000 to 230,000, while
the number of regular heroin users increased by 140%, from 50,000 to 120,000 (UNODC 2009).
Moreover, there has been an increase in the prevalence of injecting drug use, a practice thought
to be imported by Afghan refugees from neighboring Iran and Pakistan (MCN 2013; Saif-urRehman et al. 2007; Todd et al. 2012b). This is of special concern, for it introduces a host of
well-documented risks and harms, not the least of which is HIV infection and syringe-mediated
syndemics (Pates et al. 2012; Bulled and Singer 2011).
The Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH 2014) estimates there could be as many as
23,000 IDUs in the country, most of whom reside in urban districts. Kabul City4, with 12,5415,
has the highest absolute number and concentration of injectors in Afghanistan. According to the
most recent data (from 2012), Kabul also has the second highest6 HIV prevalence among IDUs

2014). That figure doesn’t include alcohol, as the State Department figure for Afghanistan does. The
prevalence rates for just alcohol use in the US for those 18 and older are 87.6% (lifetime), 71% (past
year), and 56.3% (past month) (NIAAA 2014). Nor does that 9.2% include tobacco, which 19% (46.6
million) of US adults smoke in the form of cigarettes (Agaku et al. 2012; CDC 2012). And the harmful
effects of smoking are staggering: 443,000 premature deaths result each year from smoking or exposure
to second-hand smoke, and 8.6 million people live with serious smoking-related illnesses (CDC 2012).
Children, too, are affected. In fact, 54% of children (3-11 years) in the US are exposed to second-hand
smoke and thus also to the risk of serious smoking-related illness. 150,000 to 300,000 children under the
age of 18 months experience lower respiratory tract infections due to exposure to second-hand smoke
(CDC 2012). Therefore, readers of the story of Afghan drug use as presented in official reports, such as
those frequently cited in this thesis, are encouraged to keep this other side of the story in mind, especially
when encountering reports of many drug users (up to 50% in southern and northern Afghanistan) giving
opium to their children (UNDOC 2009) or of 300,000 Afghan children being affected by drug use (DOS
2012). Keeping both stories in mind does not diminish the gravity of Afghanistan’s drug-related
problems, but it does present an obstacle to feelings of superiority or self-righteousness, which reading
the Afghan story in isolation could (and, arguably, is often meant to) provoke.
4
Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, Kabul refers to Kabul City, not Kabul Province.
5
This number varies across reports, suggesting both an important increase and the difficulty of estimating
such statistics. The World Bank (2008) estimates 1,251 IDUs in Kabul City (2006-07). Maguet and
Majeed (2010:119) report that “Kabul city has . . . 15,000-20,000 heroin users (mainly injectors).” The
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH 2014) reports 12,541 IDUs for 2012.
6
Herat has the highest prevalence at 13.3% (MoPH 2014). Previous surveys have detected prevalences in
Herat as high as 18.2% (MoPH 2014) and 18.4% (Ruiseñor-Escudero et al. 2014) and as low as 3.24%
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in the country at 2.4% (MoPH 2014). Previous studies based on data from 2005 to 2009 (Todd et
al. 2007b, 2011; MoPH 2010; Ruiseñor-Escudero et al. 2014) found similar rates (2.1%-3.2%),
suggesting the epidemic is relatively stable at present (Ruiseñor-Escudero et al. 2014; Todd et al.
2011). However, these same studies (as well as Todd et al. 2008 and MoPH 2014) also found
high or significant rates of injection-equipment sharing, purchase of sex, low condom use, and
men having sex with other males. Such HIV-risk behaviors amidst the accomplished noxious
environment of contemporary Afghanistan indicate therefore that the stability of the epidemic in
Kabul may be only apparent or short-lived. Indeed, ample evidence demonstrates that injectiondriven epidemics can escalate rapidly, even explosively. For example, HIV prevalence increased
from 0% to 50% in six months among IDUs in northeastern India (Sarkar et al. 1993), from 1%
to 43% in one year in Bangkok (Choopanya et al. 1991), from .625% to 23% in less than a year
in Karachi (Bokhari et al. 2007), and from 9% to 51.5% in approximately one year in Sargodah,
Pakistan (Emmanuel et al. 2009). HIV incidence in Kaliningrad, Russia, primarily among IDUs,
increased by 6,744% in one year (Liitsola et al. 1998).
Fortunately, ample research indicates how to prevent and curtail HIV transmission among
IDUs, namely, by scaling up combined provision of needle and syringe programs (NSPs), opioid
substitution therapy (OST), and antiretroviral therapy (ART) (Degenhardt et al. 2010; Des Jarlais
2010; Strathdee et al. 2010; WHO et al. 2012). Each of these interventions exists in Afghanistan
and has received governmental sanction, but their scale is vastly inadequate (MCN 2012, 2013;
MoPH 2014; Todd et al. 2012b). For example, these three harm reduction measures combined
cover only 25% of the 19,000-23,000 IDUs in the country (MoPH 2014). Only 4.2% of people
living with HIV (MoPH 2014) and .6% of HIV-positive IDUs (Petersen et al. 2013) are using

(Nasir et al. 2011). See Ruiseñor-Escudero et al. 2014 for a possible explanation of the extreme spread of
this range.
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ART. Only nine NSPs operate in the country (Petersen et al. 2013). In 2007, only three were in
Kabul (Todd et al. 2011), a city with over 3 million people and more than 12,000 IDUs. Only 71
people have used OST in the last three years (MoPH 2014).
Knowing what to do and being able to do it, however, are very different things (Pisani
2010; Singer et al. 2005). At least two obstacles impede implementation of effective HIVprevention measures in Afghanistan. First, problem drug use, HIV, and human development in
general do not appear to be primary concerns of the foreign governments that have invaded and
occupied Afghanistan and that now fund 85% of its budget ($3.7 billion), nearly half ($1.6
billion) of which goes toward “security.” For example, the US spent $416.2 billion on military
operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2012, while providing, during that same period, only
$25.2 billion in aid—much of which wound up back in the donor countries via contracts with
donor-country service providers. While the US military spends $100 million a day in
Afghanistan, all international donors combined spend only $7 million a day (Ruttig 2013). Put
differently, other calculations show the US spending $1 million a year per soldier in Afghanistan
and international development donors spending a meager $93 a year per Afghan (Mercille 2013).
In these terms, the $5 million from international donors that accounts for nearly all ($5.3 million)
spending on HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan in 2013 (MoPH 2014) equals what the US spends
annually to keep five soldiers in the country. Meanwhile, Afghanistan has the highest infant
mortality rate in the world (CIA 2015b), 36% of Afghans cannot meet their basic needs, over
80% of the population cannot access safe water (World Bank 2010), 60% of children are
malnourished (Ruttig 2013), problem drug use is rising sharply, and a potential explosive HIV
epidemic is in the making (MoPH 2014; UNODC 2009). In short, ample resources exist to meet
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the enormous unmet accomplished need in Afghanistan, not the least of which pertains to drug
use and HIV, but the political will and proper balance of power do not.7
Second, abstinence-based approaches to drug use in Afghanistan predominate (Todd et
al. 2012b). Recent reports (MCN 2013; UNODC 2009, 2014b) give little attention to harm
reduction measures (e.g., NSPs and OST), emphasizing instead drug-use prevention and
rehabilitative treatment, despite harm reduction’s explicit incorporation into the country’s
National Drug Demand Reduction Policy (MCN 2012). Plausible reasons for the predominance
of abstinence-based approaches over harm reduction approaches include Islam’s proscriptions on
the use of intoxicants (Hasnain 2005)8, involvement of the abstinence-promoting Colombo Plan
(Todd et al. 2007a, 2012b) in developing and implementing drug policy in Afghanistan (MCN
2012, 2013), and the US State Department’s role as the largest funder9 of treatment in
Afghanistan. After all, the US bans federal funding of NSPs inside its own borders (Castillo
2014), only 16 of its states have legalized NSPs10 (LawAtlas 2014), and it remains the
longstanding leader of a punitive, militarized abstinence-based approach to drug use11 at home
and abroad (Chien et al. 2000; Reinarman and Levine 2013; Singer 2004).
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Although the recent election of Ashraf Ghani could potentially alter this situation somewhat, his quick
signing of the new security pact with the US (Walsh and Ahmed 2014), his lifting of the ban on night
raids (Nordland and Shah 2014), allegations that his election campaign (as well as those of his opponents)
may have relied upon drug money (Nordland 2014), and the inclusion of Rashid Dostum—“a warlord par
excellence” (Riedel 2014), “known killer” (Ghani 2009), and alleged war criminal (Democracy Now!
2014; Lasseter 2008)—in the unity government as vice president (Nordland and Walsh 2014) is not
encouraging.
8
But see Kamarulzaman and Saifuddeen 2010 for an interpretation of Islam that sees it as sanctioning
harm reduction. Also, see Todd et al. 2007a for a review of harm reduction measures in the three Muslim
countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Malaysia.
9
It is worth noting, however, that this figure must be quite modest given that only $2 million (1%) of the
Afghan health budget was allocated to drug-demand reduction in 2011 (MCN 2013).
10
Yet NSPs are not restricted to these 16. They exist in 33 states and the District of Columbia (amfAR
2014).
11
Although there are hopeful signs that the US-led war on drugs and drug users may be abating
somewhat (e.g., changes in marijuana laws in several states, growing support for increased access to
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These two obstacles present serious challenges to curtailing the spread of HIV among
IDUs in Afghanistan and preventing its potential transmission to the broader population. The
controversy surrounding OST is a particular case in point. Given the importance of OST (Bruce
2010; MacArthur et al. 2012) as an element in the recommended combined-intervention
approach to HIV among IDUs (Degenhardt et al. 2010), it is particularly troubling that OST
remains only a single pilot program in Afghanistan and that the Ministry of Counter Narcotics
has repeatedly blocked the importation of methadone despite its own sanctioning of OST in the
National Drug Demand Reduction Policy (MCN 2012), a very positive third-party evaluation of
the pilot program (Maguet et al. 2012; Todd et al. 2012b; UNODC 2013b), and the WHO’s
including methadone on its list of essential medicines (WHO 2013). Therefore, because the
scale-up of OST seems highly unlikely in the near term, combined interventions are necessary,
and urgent action is needed12, physician and public health researcher Catherine S. Todd, MD,
MPH, and colleagues investigated the feasibility of a non-OST route transition intervention
(RTI) as an alternative to OST and a complement to the general HIV-prevention, drug-treatment,
and harm reduction armamentarium.
RTI refers to interventions that encourage and help enable users to transition to less
harmful methods of consuming the same drug. Nicotine patches and OST are examples of such
interventions. Efforts to facilitate transition from injecting to smoking heroin is another (Bridge
2010; Hunt et al. 1999). Given the numerous harms associated with injecting (e.g., bacterial and
viral infection, infectious disease syndemics, overdose, and vein damage), prevention of

naloxone, and the recent appointment of a drug czar, Michael Botticelli, who supports a public-health
approach to drug use).
12
HIV epidemics among IDUs are best averted by implementing prevention measures before prevalence
reaches 5% (Des Jarlais 2010). Once it reaches approximately 20%, they can become “self-perpetuating”
(Des Jarlais et al. 2000). As already noted, rates ranging from 2.1% to 3.2% have been observed among
IDUs in Kabul (MoPH 2010, 2014; Ruiseñor-Escudero et al. 2014; Todd et al. 2007b, 2011).
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initiation to injecting or transition to non-injecting routes of drug administration can significantly
reduce the harms associated with drug use (Bridge 2010; Des Jarlais et al. 2014).
Transitions from injecting to non-injecting drug use among IDUs in New York City may
have protected against HCV infection (Des Jarlais et al. 2014). Distribution of foil13 in the UK to
encourage heroin injectors to switch to smoking had positive results. Whereas 46% of
participating IDUs reported having smoked heroin at least once in the four weeks prior to the
intervention, 85% reported at its conclusion that they had smoked heroin at least once when they
would have otherwise injected (Pizzey and Hunt 2008). A similar study in Germany found that
65.3% of participants used the provided foil, choosing to smoke rather than inject heroin (Stöver
and Schäffer 2014). Combined with these findings, the fact that smoking (and oral ingestion) has
historically been the dominant means of consuming opiates in Afghanistan (Saif-ur-Rehman et
al. 2007), a prior study of Kabul IDUs has noted a high rate (27.6% - 49.7%) of switching from
injecting to smoking (Todd et al. 2012a), and recent surveys (MCN 2011; UNODC 2014b) of
drug users in Afghanistan have observed significant rates of heroin smoking (as high as 94.6%)
suggest that a smoking RTI could constitute part of a solution to the emerging HIV epidemic in
Afghanistan in general and the obstacles to OST in particular. The following sections describe
the investigation of that potential and report its findings.
METHODS
Participant Eligibility
The aim of this study was to assess the feasibility of adding to existing harm reduction
programs in Kabul an RTI to encourage and enable drug injectors to transition to the less risky
drug-administration route of smoking. Data collection occurred under the direction of Catherine
13

Smoking (or chasing, as in “chasing the dragon”) heroin involves heating heroin powder on a piece of
aluminum foil and inhaling the fumes through a small tube.
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S. Todd and colleagues between June and November 2012 in Kabul, Afghanistan. The data and
analysis presented here concern only the Stakeholder Component of a larger formative study that
also comprised a Client Component, which involved injecting drug users in Kabul. Stakeholder
participants were Dari or Pashto speaking adults representing the police, the Afghan Ministries
of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and Public Health (MoPH), and harm reduction programs in Kabul.
Prior to data collection, approval was granted by the institutional review boards (IRBs) of the
MoPH, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and Columbia University,14 and approval of data
analysis was granted by the IRB of the University of Connecticut.15
Study Design and Measures
Study participants included 15 key stakeholders who were recruited for semi-structured
in-depth interviews (IDIs) from institutions and organization located in Kabul. The groups
represented were the MCN (n=2), the MoPH (n=2), police and workers involved in programs
that address problem drug use (n=5), and program managers and outreach workers involved in
harm reduction programs (n=6.) The IDIs were supplemented by a focus group discussion (FGD)
that was conducted with harm reduction staff who were not part of the IDIs.
Prior studies informed design of the interview guide, which was pre-tested for face and
content validity on three stakeholders who were not among the 15 study participants (Todd et al.
2009b, 2011). The IDIs sought to gauge participants’ knowledge about harm reduction practices
and existing harm reduction programs and to discover the challenges that such programs face.
The IDIs also involved the reading of a description of an RTI program model by interviewers,
after which participants were asked about the desirability of such a program, what challenges it
might face, and how different groups might react to it. The FGD centered on similar questions as
14
15

Catherine S. Todd was affiliated with Colombia University at the time the study was initiated.
University of Connecticut IRB approval applies to William Tootle and Merrill Singer.
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well as issues of why people begin to use drugs in general and initiate injecting in particular and
whether any harm reduction programs were already encouraging injectors to transition to
smoking.
Data Collection
Study staff identified participants at their place of employment. Informed consent was
obtained, and participants were given the option of conducting the interview at their own or the
study’s office. For interviews conducted at the study office, participants were offered a meal.
The FGD occurred at the study office, where participants were compensated with a meal. Prior to
recording, participants selected pseudonyms. One investigator moderated the discussion with
another staff member present to document main themes and non-verbal communication.
Data Analysis
At the study office, all IDI and FGD files were maintained on a password-protected
computer, transcribed in Dari, and then translated into English. One of the investigators reviewed
translations against the original transcripts for accuracy. Final anonymized English transcripts
were transferred to me via secure connection.
I used the qualitative-data-analysis software HyperRESEARCH (3.5.2) and followed
Bernard and Ryan (2010) and Creswell (2013) in coding, analyzing, and abstracting themes from
the data. Specifically, this involved recursive reading of the transcripts, identifying and coding
salient features of the data, calculating code frequencies as a measure of the significance of
coded material, and arranging codes into themes and subthemes. The two main themes (barriers
and benefits) derive from the survey instrument itself and thus reflect the purpose of the study,
while the subthemes emerged from a reading of the data. Because RTI is a harm reduction
measure, investigating its feasibility required also exploring participants’ views on harm
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reduction in general and eliciting their descriptions of existing harm reduction services and
community members’ perception of them. The two main themes therefore refer both to RTI in
particular and harm reduction in general. They also refer to treatment because, although not part
of the instrument, participants repeatedly discussed it.
Barriers to harm reduction, RTI, and treatment constitute the most salient primary theme
in the data. The term barriers thus summarizes numerous secondary themes. Participants
discussed many different barriers to harm reduction, RTI, and treatment. Some they linked only
to one of these three intervention dimensions; others they linked to all three. Yet even when a
specific barrier (e.g., security) is linked by a participant only to, for example, existing harm
reduction programs, that barrier obviously applies to RTI and treatment programs as well.
Consequently, many barrier subthemes appear as barriers in general—that is, to existing harm
reduction services, the potential RTI at the center of this study, and existing treatment services—
and do no specify any one of the three intervention dimensions. When a barrier is dimensionspecific, however, that is made clear. Discussion of the other primary theme (benefits), however,
concentrates on the benefits of RTI in particular rather than those that apply in general to all
three. But, as will become apparent, any singular focus on RTI is hard to maintain because
treatment perpetually gets pushed into view. Themes and subthemes are arranged approximately
in descending order of salience based on the number of participants who expressed them. Finally,
I have made only occasional and very minor alterations to the transcript excerpts for clarity.
Most of the bracketed text was inserted by the translators. I have added a few additional
bracketed insertions only where it seemed necessary for clarity.
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THEMES
Barriers to Harm Reduction, RTI, and Treatment
Five kinds of barriers emerged from the data: cultural views on drug use, knowledge and
opposition, institutional challenges, physical and economic risk environment, and route of drug
administration. Discussion and illustration of each of these barrier subthemes follows.
Cultural Views on Drug Use

1. Stigma surrounding drug use
Participants reported that drug use and drug users are highly stigmatized in Afghanistan,
as is the case in many other parts of the world (Friedman 1998; Room 2005; Singer and Page
2014), resulting in barriers to implementation of and access to harm reduction and treatment
services (Ahearn et al. 2007; Link and Phelan 2006; Simmonds and Coomber 2009). The stigma
that they suffer is pervasive. As one participant (a social worker) put it, they are “reviled” and
“expelled” from society.
They [addicts] don’t have any place in the society, they are isolated from the society, and
can’t live in the society. They are reviled, they can’t live in the society. . . . The people
don’t like them even when they are treated. Ten times they are expelled, they are not seen
with a good sight because an addict is a thief, pocket-ripper, he can do anything. The
people don’t think of them as a good person and when they are treated, they say that he is
not washed out so that [while] all his acts are cleaned his stealing remains. When there is
no work, he certainly would steal; their life is difficult in the society, they are expelled
from the society. . . .
Another social worker described how stigma impedes drug users’ everyday movement and
mobility in society.
Like the normal people who can support their family and the way that they can go
everywhere, the addicts can’t be like them in the society. They are seen as without a
personality [a disrespected person], they are seen as low character and status people; they
are seen like a thief or as a murderer.
Stigma also affects the ability of agencies to implement services for drug users.
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The residents of the district have discrimination against them. Even in some hotels that
we wanted to take as the safe place, when we mentioned the addicts, we said that monthly
we would give you this much money. They completely refused it, they said that “no,
when you bring the addicts in here, we don’t need your money, we can’t give any
service.” There is a lot of discrimination towards them. [NGO project supervisor]
As already noted, stigmatization of drug users is pervasive. Government actions embody and
reproduce it.
In Kabul, as I said there’s stigma, even in high governmental offices. There’s
discrimination against them; they are not seen as humans. Government, the Ministry of
Public Health have a great attention in the harm reduction policies but the Ministry of
Counter Narcotics have fewer policies or even no policies in this field. The Ministry of
Interior Affairs, from the security point of view, they interfere and collect and gather all
the drug users, but they don’t know the outcome of such an act. They imprison them and
don’t know the bad outcomes of it; they don’t have any better solution than this. [NGO
project manager]
Family members are not immune to its influence.
Yes, it [stigma] is a big danger. Like I said before, that even the families do not see the
addict with a good eye, so according to this basis, all the society see the addicted with an
insulting and insolent eye. They say like that “he is a criminal” and in everywhere
something happens, they hold him accountable, that you have done this, which he didn’t
commit it. [police officer]
Service providers are not immune either, as a doctor’s comments suggest. They imply a causal
link between character flaws (in this case, laziness) and addiction, illustrating how stigma can
obscure the social and structural origins (B. Alexander 2000; Baer et al. 2013) of problem drug
use by framing it as the pathology or inadequacy of individuals.
Well, firstly the addicts, the ones who use drugs, a special characteristic of them is
laziness. They are lazy. . . . They are lazy and they are always in one corner.
Stigma, however, is not confined to drug users. Its spoiling reach extends also to those
who are merely associated indirectly with drug use, such as drug user family members and
outreach workers.
Their children are not taken to the schools . . . . They [headmasters] don’t take [accept]
them to [into] the schools, lots of them are not taken, they don’t take the children. They
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say that you are an addict and you would addict other students. . . . They don’t take them,
they beat them. Just now, all these older boys [points to a hospitalized IDU] are taken
away [out] of the school [and told] that you are addicts and you will addict other boys.
[social worker]
When we go to the field, the people [but not the police] talk behind us [back biting], they
bother and tease us, but we take it easy and say we are serving for God and it is our work.
We don’t care about the things [that people say]. [social worker]
Q: So even when he is on his way to seek care from a harm reduction center, they bother
him and stigmatize him?
A: Yes, this itself is a problem, so it is a big shame, to the patient. The people don’t see
them with a good eye; they don't see them as [a] patient. If he is seen as a patient, then it
would be possible that these patients may find a feeling that I am a patient, and I should
do this job [quit drugs]. [police officer]
Interviews with Afghan drug users from the Client Component of the study confirm these
reports of the extreme stigmatization of drug users and the consequent exclusion and
discrimination that they face (Santelices n. d.).
2. Dominance of abstinence-based approaches to drug use
The preference for treatment and abstinence over harm reduction pervades the data,
reflecting the emphasis by recent reports (MCN 2013; UNODC 2009, 2014b) on drug use
prevention and rehabilitative treatment and supporting previous findings (Todd et al. 2009a,
2012b) that abstinence-based treatment approaches predominate in Kabul. This may be explained
by the factors already mentioned above (Islam’s proscriptions on intoxication and the
involvement of abstinence-promoting governments and organizations in funding and developing
drug-related programs and policies in Afghanistan), as well as by the fact that many study
participants work in organizations that provide treatment. Whatever the case, the preference for
treatment and abstinence appears in the data in two ways.
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First, in response to questions about harm reduction services, several participants
responded by discussing abstinence-based treatment programs. Second, participants frequently
described treatment and abstinence as the ultimate goal of any service (NSPs, counseling,
transition to smoking, etc.) for drug users. In fact, the majority of participants expressed some
form of this view. A doctor’s response to a question about the benefits of RTI illustrates this
point well.
A: One thing more it is that . . . we usually want to change the IDUs to smoking, and then
do the treatment on them, [but] we can’t bring the IDU patients to treatment, and if they
are brought to it [treatment through RTI], then it is an important and qualified way.
Q: That is, they would be easily and quickly treated?
A: Quickly they are treated and the number of IDU patients would become less, and the
number of patients under treatment would increase.
It should be noted, however, that one participant (an NGO project supervisor) reported that drug
users themselves are requesting detoxification and treatment.
A: As we go to the field in these days, and are in contact with them, they are requesting . .
. detoxification, the detoxification centers.
Q: Treatment?
A: Yes, they say that we reduced the drug use, we changed from injection to smoking,
and make the smoking less, we want to go to the detoxification, and we want to abandon
the drugs. Most of them want detoxification.
3. Segregation of drug users from general population
Segregation relates to the theme of sanctioned space for drug use (discussed below), but
it is not limited to that theme. Segregation refers to a broader issue of which sanctioned space is
but a part. It has more to do with a kind of benevolent othering that proposes to help drug users
by removing them from places and situations of harassment and injury, from people and

15

encounters that thwart their attempts at self-improvement through participation in harm reduction
or treatment programs.
Several participants recommended some form of segregation as a way around the
stigmatization that drug users experience and the barrier to services that it presents, but they
seem unaware of the possibility that such a policy itself could be a form of stigmatization and
one, moreover, that could reinforce the very stigma that it aims to circumvent. The segregation
theme thus further illustrates the pervasiveness and subtlety of both the stigma surrounding drug
use and drug users and the expulsion that it warrants and activates. To be sure, refuges or
shelters, which a social worker proposed establishing, would certainly benefit indigent and
harassed drug users, but it is important to recognize the subtle (or not so subtle) and detrimental
operation of stigma that segregating interventions can effect. The suggestion by a doctor, for
example, that “if they [drug users] are transferred to a place [i.e., a service center away from
business areas] . . . it would be more beneficial, and the people would get rid of their brawling”
represents such an intervention that warrants critical examination, as does the following proposal
by a police officer.
We have this one appeal from the government as a citizen of this country, that in a far
region, for example, in Deh Sabz in Khak Jabar district far from the aggregation of local
people, should be a base, a big hospital made for them [drug users]. They should be taken
under continual treatment, not like now in the resident area, a hospital [NGO] came with
extravagant money, and rented a house, and keep the addicts for 15 and 10 days there,
just so they are happy. . . . As a first step, a hospital should be made for them, a very
fundamental hospital should be built for them. . . . Third, all the addicts should be
collected in a very caring method, not with the force of stones and stakes, or with kicks.
They are humans; we should respect their human dignity. Fourth, the addicts should be
gathered from the capital in a very good way, and should be taken under continuous
treatment, under continual treatment.
Such policies of “social and spatial segregation” could very well further stigmatize and
marginalize drug users, as Christopher Smith (2011:306) has observed among methadone clients
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in Toronto. Moreover, such policies ignore or obscure the social, political, and economic origins
of problem drug use (B. Alexander 2000; Baer et al. 2013)—which, as I have already noted,
stigmatization facilitates—and share a degree of affinity with perhaps the most extreme
expression of the sociospatial segregation of drug users, namely, their mass incarceration in the
United States (M. Alexander 2012).
4. Collective harm related to individuals’ drug use
Nearly half the participants noted that drug users not only harm themselves, but also
society as a whole. For example, one doctor stated that drug users’ “risk is not only for
themselves, but it is more to the whole society” and another that “they don’t know the calamity it
[drug use] brings to their families and how harmful they be for their family, country, and
society.”
This line of argument could be used to gain support for controversial harm reduction
measures like RTI by appealing to the broader society’s self-interest. Therefore, the theme of
collective harm could be seen as a facilitator of RTI and other harm reduction programs and not
a barrier, as I have classified it. But such an argument risks blaming the victim and thus
exacerbating the harms of problem drug use to the degree that it conceals the reality that problem
drug use is a structural accomplishment (B. Alexander 2000; Baer et al. 2013) and thereby
forecloses the possibility of accomplishing counteracting structural or political-economic
interventions. Moreover, contrary to the progressive and activist roots of harm reduction (Smith,
2012), such a framing (mis)portrays harm reduction as protecting non-users (“us”) from
dangerous, diseased drug users (“them”) (Brook and Stringer 2005) rather than reducing the
harm and suffering that users experience because of, one might say, “us”—that is, because of
systemic structural inequalities and inequities, discriminatory laws, punitive drug policy,
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scapegoating and stigmatization, etc. For these reasons, then, I classify emphasis of collective
harm as a barrier.
Knowledge and Opposition

1. Lack of knowledge about harm reduction and the harms of drug use
Participants frequently noted that a significant barrier to accessing and implementing
harm reduction services is a lack of knowledge among drug users and throughout society in
general about what harm reduction is (e.g., not enabling), what its benefits are, what the harms of
injecting are, etc. These views reinforce Stanekzai et al.’s (2012) finding that Kabul residents
“seemed relatively unsupportive of harm reduction, potentially representing lack of knowledge
or misconceptions about harm reduction.” An NGO project manager expresses this theme well.
By and large, the deficiency and shortage of knowledge and awareness about the projects
of harm reduction between the drug users and the society, between the people is the main
and fundamental reason [for addicts’ trouble accessing harm reduction services]. The
harm reduction is not explained and clarified to the people in the way it should be. It is
not said to them that why and for what purpose do we need the harm reduction? Why do
we supply or provide the harm reduction and this is why they have a wrong thought about
the harm reduction in the society. They think that the services of harm reduction increase
the drug users and drug use, that giving injectors syringes and needles is in a way
persuading them and leading them in a wrong way. There is no general awareness and
knowledge and even knowledge between the society and between the policy makers.
In other words, lack of knowledge encourages opposition. In fact, many participants suggested
that much harassment of drug users and opposition to harm reduction stem from inaccurate
knowledge about harm reduction, addiction, and the public health implications of injecting drug
use. A few also pointed out that some drug users simply do not know about existing services,
which is clearly a barrier, albeit one that could be comparatively easy to overcome with
investment of sufficient resources.
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2. Community opposition to harm reduction and RTI
Community opposition to harm reduction is closely related to the themes of stigma and
lack of knowledge. It refers to community-member interference, harassment of drug users and
harm reduction workers, and backlash due to lack of knowledge about harm reduction or
prejudice against drug users. It is associated with the idea that harm reduction “motivates” or
“enables” drug use. This is a challenge that an RTI could very well face.
[T]he people don’t know anything about this [RTI]. They don’t have any information.
Possibly they would say that you are motivating them. They don’t know that I am not
motivating them; instead, I am preventing diseases this way, that way. If we give them
information about the program, the people would show satisfaction; and if some of them
don’t know anything about it, they would say certainly they would say something about it
nowadays. The nonsense talking is very frequent in Afghanistan. [social worker]
Fortunately, however, many participants stated that community opposition could be
overcome by public-awareness campaigns, coalition building, and inclusion of the community in
planning and implementation of programs. Some cited personal experience of community
support as evidence for such claims. The same prescribed support-winning actions appear to
apply equally to both community and police (see below). For example, when asked what
society’s reaction would be to a smoking RTI, a social worker stated:
Well at first, we work with the people and tell them about the program of smoking and
explain that the injection has lots of harms, such as it transmits contagious diseases. If we
work with the society, the environment, slowly by the passage of time that it has this
kinds of benefits and smoking doesn’t cause any transmission of viruses and in spite that
it doesn’t transmit viruses it can also be decreased daily on addicts. In that case, the
society the environment would know and help and collaborate with us.
Likewise, regarding an RTI, a police officer said, referring to many families affected by problem
drug use, “They would welcome this work, these people.” As support for this claim, he relayed
the moving scene of “caring and desperate” mothers kissing their drug-paralyzed sons amid the
filth “under the bridge of Pul-e Sokhta,” standing near and kissing them despite the “blackness,

19

smell, and stink” that would prevent anyone else from going near them, and crying out “What
should we do with our sons?” Of course, such pain and desperation do not guarantee community
support for harm reduction measures like RTI—in fact, they could be misperceived as part of the
problem and thus decried—but they do imply a potential openness to measures like RTI that
could be appealed to and properly informed. In other words, a potential base on which
community support for RTI might be built exists. A campaign to build support might, for
example, start with those immediately impacted by addiction and work through their social
networks to raise awareness about drug use, addiction, and harm reduction.
3. Police opposition to harm reduction/RTI and harassment of drug users
Police opposition to harm reduction services and harassment of drug users appears to be
common in Kabul. Participant responses resonate with the finding by Todd et al. (2009b:115)
that drug users in the city identify the police as “the entity most likely to cause [them] problems.”
This could pose a particularly significant barrier to RTI given that drug users often switch to
injecting, which is easier to conceal than smoking, to avoid police harassment (Todd et al.
2009b, 2012b). In other words, police harassment discourages smoking, making police behavior
a significant obstacle to the implementation of an RTI. And because harassment encourages risky
injecting (needle sharing, rushed injecting, use in unsanitary conditions, etc.), it also functions as
an obstruction to harm reduction in general.
Part of the problem is spatial. “There is no knowledge between the security forces,” an
NGO project manager said, “so they think that . . . beating them [addicts] is the only solution for
it.”
Q: So you mean that when an addict wants to come to the centers, there is an obstacle in
their way, like the police?
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A: We have this problem. We are active and provide service in the Dasht Barchi district
of Kabul. Every day, the addicts are beaten by the police and the counter narcotics police
to go away from this place. And since the addicts don’t have a distinct place for
themselves, they gather in any place and the local people living there beat them, [the
police] arrest them and even to the level of death. They ask them to go away from this
place, and they scatter from that place. There is no other place, a specific place for them;
so they spend day and night under the bridge, on the streets, and in the ruined places.
They go from one place to other. This is why they don’t have access to the centers which
provide them services.
However, as with community opposition, many participants suggested that police
opposition and harassment can be overcome with education and diplomacy. For example:
At first we had some problems. We had problem with the police because they scattered
them [drug users]. When we gathered them, they scatter after they saw the police. After
the agreement we had with the police, they are helping us now in the 5 districts and we
don’t have any problem now. [NGO project supervisor]
The reaction of the police, in my opinion, if this program [RTI] is started directly like
this, the reaction would be very serious. We still have this problem with police, it is been
a few years that this program [either harm reduction programs in general or a kind of RTI
program; unclear what program the participant is referring to] has started, but still we
have problems with police. The training and orientation of the police about this program
is very important. Before this program is started, they should have awareness. And when
they have information and it is explained to them in the right way, then I would say that
they won’t have this much reaction. [government program officer]
Added a physician:
The police, naturally their reaction [to RTI], if god is willing, would be positive. . . . If
god is willing, there won’t be any objection to this program, and other when a new
program is started, before it is implemented, the police should be made aware of it, such
as to how this program is implemented, what would be its benefits, and what would be
the harms of it. If this is in every district, in every field, the program would be carried on
well. If there is no awareness, not only the police but the Wakeel/Arbab [community
representative] or mullah [religious scholar] would prevent such programs, so before
everything, they should be made aware of the details of the program and it should be said
to them, we are implementing this program to see that the children, the people, and the
patients are safe from the risk. It is possible that they would make some annoyance [if
they are not informed].
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4. Intimidation or interference from drug traffickers
Approximately half of the participants claimed that drug traffickers would react
negatively to an RTI or recounted actual interference from them. For example:
Their [drug sellers’] first reaction [to RTI] will be that it’s a big economical loss to them.
If we treat a patient, for example, in Kabul, we have hospitals that completely treat the
patients. For example, in one time when they check out, they check out 30 or 35 patients.
They spend 40 or 45 days at the hospital. Each of them at least spend 200 or 300 afghanis
[the Afghan currency], on drugs every day. If they spend one dollar on drugs, so calculate
how much it will be? It will be 30 or 35 dollars and it’s a big loss to the sellers. In fact,
they try hard to defame the program. They try to do this through people who are with
them, the ones who work in the governmental offices. They are in government or in
districts or in security. They are their partners. [doctor]
Interestingly, it is the presumed close association between RTI and treatment and thus abstinence
(see below)—reflecting the already noted predominance of abstinence-based approaches—that
allows this participant to predict drug trafficker opposition to an RTI. Another participant, in
response to a question about what obstacles drug users face in accessing harm reduction services,
recounted actual interference from drug traffickers.
A: That is because there are many drug dealers. The problem is that there the dealers sit
on our way. Many times they have taken our way in Bagh Ali Mardan. Even they had
guns and wanted to explode our car. We have told them that, brother, we are here to just
carry the message to them. Anybody who wants to go voluntarily, they can. We don’t
force them to do that. We are not police and we have told them not to behave so bad with
us. Even they would have taken out the gun and showed us and told us that if we come
again, they would kill us.
Q: And you tell them that you don’t prevent them but you change them from one type [of
drug use] to another one?
A: We change them from one type to another very simply, but still because of their
business and five afghanis, they hinder us. [social worker]
However, many participants claim that drug traffickers would not interfere with an RTI
precisely because, as the previous participant noted, an RTI is about route transition and not
cessation per se. For example:
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Harm reduction programs are mostly not against the drug sellers. They [harm reduction
programs] want to decrease the harms the addicts are facing. In this case, they [drug
dealers] don’t have a problem with the project. Because it is not anti-intoxication, or
making them abandon it, the programs of harm reduction just say to them that in the
counseling that you abandon it, and they just do a counseling for them. They don’t have
any other specific program. [NGO project supervisor]
I don’t think that they would show a strong reaction [to an RTI]. For them, the consumer
doesn’t matter whether he is an injector or a smoker. [NGO project supervisor]
These people who they call smugglers or the bungs, or whatever they call them, these
people are not happy of any services. They don’t want to have any problems in the
programs that they are implementing, or the patients [buyers, drug users] become less, or
the patients are motivated like they decrease the amount of the drugs, because in here
[i.e., presumably, in programs that lead users to decrease their drug consumption] their
supply [of clients] decreases, the selling of them it is decreased. When it is decreased,
then naturally it would have an effect on them. It does not mean that bringing them to
smoking will make them angry; definitely regarding the drugs, every step that is taken it
would have an effect on them. But they would not be very much affected by this [since
RTI only changes route of drug administration]. [doctor]
The drug seller won’t have any problem in this [RTI]; the consumption is the same.
[social worker]
Still he [drug seller] becomes happy; it [drug] won’t be banned. [social worker]
Finally, as with community and police opposition, some participants suggested that
whatever antagonism toward an RTI might come from drug traffickers, it could be countered.
For example, both a doctor and a social worker recommended that hypothetical RTI
implementers actually try to reach out to drug traffickers and educate them about the program’s
aims to preempt or limit their negative reactions. Another social worker went further, suggesting
that perhaps drug sellers could be persuaded from selling drugs if only they knew their harms
and Islam’s teachings regarding drug use. Drug dealers “don’t have information and that is why
they are selling drugs,” she said. This view, however, ignores the fact that the opium trade is
worth about 14% of Afghanistan’s GDP (UNODC 2013a) and that unemployment is at about
35% (CIA 2015a). In other words, it ignores, among other things, the significant role that poppy

23

cultivation, opium production, and drug trafficking play in Afghanistan’s political economy and
the extent to which livelihoods depend on drug sales within the country.
Institutional Challenges

1. Inter-agency cooperation and coordination
Lack of cooperation, collaboration, and coordination between stakeholder agencies and
organizations emerged as a salient barrier to existing harm reduction services and as a salient
potential barrier to RTI. According to participants, the success of existing and future programs
like RTI depends on substantive, broad-based cooperation between all relevant institutions and
organizations. Asked what challenges an RTI might face, a doctor stated:
A: There are challenges, if your program is introduced through a meeting to all stake
holders, for example governmental offices and NGOs, and from every organization there
be a participant in this field, then I think that there won’t be any problems.
Q: You mean that one challenge is that if the corresponding organizations are not
involved, we will face the opposition of the corresponding organizations?
A: You would definitely face [these problems].
2. Organizational capacity
Many participants complained of insufficient harm reduction and treatment
organizational capacity to meet the needs of drug users, echoing reports (MCN 2012, 2013;
MoPH 2014) that there is a large gap between the supply of services to drug users and demand.
These complaints, sometimes bolstered by reference to UNODC (2009) statistics, were
frequently linked to lack of funding.
3. Funding
An obvious connection exists between insufficient organizational capacity and
insufficient financial support. Most of those who noted the former also noted the latter and
connected them.
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4. Professional training
Closely linked to insufficient organizational capacity and funding is the limited
professional training that many harm reduction and treatment staff have had and have access to.
Participants commented that lack of professional training limits the scope and quality of services
that organizations can provide. At least two participants (a police officer and a doctor) stressed
that for RTI to be successful, it would need to be implemented by people with appropriate
professional training. As in other developing countries (Dickson-Gómez 2012), professional
training in working with drug users appears to be limited in Afghanistan and is one arena where
international assistance could be provided.
Physical and Economic Risk Environment

1. Poverty
The majority of participants acknowledged the extreme poverty that drug users endure,
and many cited it as a barrier to harm reduction and treatment services, as well as a cause of
problem drug use. As one social worker explained, addicts “started narcotics because of
poverty.” “They were very poor; a job was not available for them. To get relieved, they started to
get high . . . then they started heroin.” Lack of shelter and the inability to afford transportation
are the markers of poverty that participants most often referred to. These, among other unmet
basic needs, are also what Todd et al. (2009b) found to be IDUs’ most pressing problems. Other
markers of extreme drug user poverty that participants noted include susceptibility to being
recruited for suicide attacks (to earn money for families) and the selling of harm reduction items.
2. No sanctioned space for drug use
Given the stigma associated with drug use, the harassment of drug users by the police and
community, drug users’ consequent need to conceal their drug use, and the difficulty of
concealing smoking, participants recommended establishing socially sanctioned spaces for this
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form of drug consumption. Justifications for such a space ranged from protecting non-users
(particularly children) from second-hand smoke to protecting drug users from harassment and
persecution and thus facilitating their access to services and enabling them to actually implement
practices that reduce harm.
For example, an NGO project manager reported that “not having a distinct place for the
drug users so that they could all use drug[s] in that place” hinders implementation of and access
to services for drug users. “Providing a place for them to use drugs is a very good service that we
can propose for them,” he continued. “If the place is distinct,” asked the interviewer, “there
every kind of service could be provided?” “The centers can provide them services,” he replied.
“This way also the addicts could have access to the services provided to them.” Focus group
members reiterated this view.
Social worker (SW) 1: In my opinion, from now if we confess it or not, there are drugs in
our country and drug users. The government also knows this and all the world also knows
this. We have the highest number of drug users in the world. The government should
designate a place for them, so that the centers which provide help for them should go and
give them services there, and they also come there and use their drugs there, use their
drugs there. In my opinion, it would make the level of injection very low.
SW2: [interrupting] It would make it lower.
SW1: It would make it lower because in provinces and districts there was once the
injectors very much the level of HIV was also very high, and one month ago when I went
there the level of injectors come to 1 percent [i.e., IDUs are 1% of drug users] because
they had a place of using drug. They would come there and would consume their drugs
there. We had counseling with them; we talked with them about the harms of injection; it
made the level of injection to one percent.
Q: In your opinion, one thing that persuades them to come from injection to smoking, it is
that we provide them facilities that we should save them from the police and people
chasing them away?
SW2: Yes.
Doctor: Provide them with safe place.
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SW3: They should have a place, a time, they would smoke; they won’t inject.
In short, many participants believe that not having a sanctioned space to use drugs
presents a significant barrier to services, especially a smoking RTI. Effective implementation of
a smoking RTI may therefore also require provision of such a space in addition to the standard
counseling, foil, and matches. Precedent for such “tolerance areas” exists (Riley and O’Hare
2000). For example, they have taken the form of drug consumption rooms or supervised/safe
injecting rooms in Europe, Australia, and Canada (Haemmig and van Beek 2005; Hedrich et al.
2010), as well as unmolested open-drug-scene parks in Frankfurt, Germany, in the 1980s that
facilitated provision of services to heavy drug users (Riley and O’Hare 2000). But not all
tolerance areas have been a success. “Needle Park” in Zurich, Switzerland, for example, was
closed twice in the early and mid 1990s because it became “unmanageable” (Riley and O’Hare
2000). Nevertheless, the successes demonstrate that the concept is viable. And if one considers
how the ruined Russian Cultural Center in Kabul once functioned as a kind of tolerance zone
before drug users were evicted from it in 2010 (Redmond 2013), one could perhaps argue that
precedent for at least a very limited form of de facto sanctioned drug use space exists in Kabul as
well. In the case of Kabul, what appears to be needed, however, is not so much an open-air
tolerance zone as an enclosed space where smoking can occur and services can be delivered,
including the option of treatment for those who desire it.
3. Lack of security
Several participants indicated that lack of security presents a barrier to harm reduction
and treatment services. This applies to Kabul, but especially to areas outside the city. For
example, a social worker suggested that service providers could use protection by government
security officers both at their centers and out in the field. “No one has guaranteed our security,”
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she said. A doctor explained that although areas outside Kabul need services for drug users,
“they are not secure, and personnel with a low salary do not go to work there. Like Maidan Shar
Wardak and Logar provinces; there is war and no one could go there from Kabul to work.”
Another doctor summed up the situation thus: “We can tell you that it [provision of harm
reduction services] can only be inside the Kabul city. The surroundings, for example, some
districts have security problems where personnel can’t be sent.”
But lack of security doesn’t just impede service providers; it impedes potential service
users as well.
Besides this [distance and terrain] there are many other problems, like financial and
security problems, that they [addicts] can’t reach to harm reduction services. . . . [I]n
Afghanistan we have security problems in general, so the addicts can't easily come to
centers to take the packages and become aware of those harms, so, itself is a problem.
[social worker, KI 14]
These “security problems” persist into the present. In fact, 2014 was the “bloodiest”16 since the
war began in 2001 (Rasmussen 2014).
Route of Drug Administration

1. Drivers of injecting
Supporting Todd et al.’s (2009b) findings among IDUs, participants claimed that
injecting is more desirable than smoking because of its potential to conceal drug use (e.g., from
harassing police), more pleasurable and longer-lasting effects, greater ease of administration, and
greater efficiency (i.e., enhanced per-unit effect). Likewise, they also noted the potential for
programs to encourage injecting by providing more services to injectors than to non-injectors
(Todd et al. 2009b). All of these are potential barriers to an RTI.
It is worth observing that the barrier to RTI posed by the justifiably desirable
concealment that injecting affords has an additional dimension. Concealment could also be a
16

As measured by the number of Afghan military and civilian deaths.
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barrier to RTI to the degree that it leads the public to think that RTI increases drug use. That is, if
all the relatively concealed current injecting suddenly turned into easily detected smoking,
communities might inaccurately (but understandably) perceive that RTI worsens the problem
that it purports to address. A social worker signaled this possibility:
[T]he people would first think of it [RTI] negatively and would say that the number of
addicts increased. But in fact the number of addicts are very high. Since they inject and
the people don’t see them. They inject it immediately, while in smoking, it takes some
time. The people see them. If this information is given before to the people, the society,
and the centers, that we have such a program and say to them that injection has this kind
of harms and the benefits of smoking are these that we can reduce the amount of drug on
them daily . . . . They won't be obstacle. Instead, they would help the centers.
This potential problem that she points to intersects with previously discussed barriers, namely,
lack of knowledge and the consequent opposition that can result from it.
2. Difficulty of the smoking technique
To the degree that smoking is difficult to learn, as a few participants indicated, the
smoking technique itself is a barrier to RTI. For example, a doctor in the focus group explained
that “the ones who first are smokers and then injectors . . . can do [it, i.e., smoke] easily.” But
the ones who directly started injection, they don’t know the meaning of smoking, like it’s
difficult for him. There are patients who are directly IDUs. The ones who first are
smokers and then become IDU, they can do it; and the ones who are directly IDUs, it is
difficult for them.
Benefits of RTI
As with barriers, participants discussed many standard, well-documented benefits (e.g.,
disease prevention) that apply equally to harm reduction, RTI, and treatment, whether or not they
explicitly linked them to all three intervention dimensions. The majority, however, did link
prevention of disease, wounds, and overdose to harm reduction and RTI. This is an important
finding because it demonstrates familiarity with harm reduction theory and practice among at
least a small subset of service providers and other stakeholders in Kabul. But rather than rehearse
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these well-known benefits and discuss this second primary theme in general, as I did with
barriers, I limit the following discussion to three benefits that are particularly relevant to
implementing an RTI program. Despite this focus on RTI, however, treatment remains a
commonly mentioned topic among participants, reflecting its overall salience in the data.
1. Facilitates treatment
Almost all participants noted that smoking facilitates treatment or that an RTI would.
Many, in fact, emphasized this as one of RTI’s benefits. The following comments of a doctor
illustrate the theme best, as well as the general notion of tapering drug consumption to achieve
abstinence that pervades the data.
There are a lot of benefits [of an RTI]. It is very difficult to directly start treatment on
injectors. When they are once changed to smoking, then we can step by step decrease
their drug amount and then make them ready for treatment and make them quit it. . . .
This program definitely has benefits because if we could change them from injection to
smoking, we can easily start treatment on them. . . . It is easier to cure the smokers. The
patients who inject or use any kind of injection, they are very difficult to cure as
compared to the treatment of the smokers. . . .When they come here, their detoxification
stage is very long. It takes them more time, the difficulties they face in the detoxification
process, and the pains and other complications in this process. And they face more
difficulties in quitting drugs as compared to smoking addicts.
Given the dominance of abstinence-based treatment approaches, as already discussed and which
this theme further supports, an RTI’s potential to facilitate treatment could prove particularly
effective in persuading stakeholders to adopt it or permit its implementation. In fact, when
combined with the potential to immediately reduce HIV risk (by reducing injecting), the
potential to facilitate treatment makes for a compelling argument in favor of RTI. Moreover, the
combination of these potentials illustrates how “abstentionism” can be compatible with harm
reduction, even if the latter does not prioritize the reduction of drug use (Riley and O’Hare
2000).
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2. Improves social standing of IDUs
The majority of participants claimed that one of the benefits of harm reduction, RTI, and
treatment is that they can improve drug users’ standing (status, character, etc.) in the eyes of their
family and society more broadly. For example, smokers are deemed to be more functional than
IDUs.
A: As it is noticed in the society, the injected addicts are mostly being chased away from
their home as compared to smoking addicts. In spite of being addicts, the smokers can
still be beneficial to their family and children but the injecting patients are not. . . .
Smoking patients come and take their narcotic drug and counseling then they go after a
work. But in contrast, the injected patients are day and night thinking of how to find drug
and inject. Even if they find drug six or seven times a day, they will inject. But the
smoking patients use only once a day, in the morning or evening and after their work.
Q: So it means that the smoking patients are more stable? They can work for the society
and are more accepted than the injectors?
A: As we have seen in the society, it’s like that. [NGO project supervisor]
Transitioning to smoking would thus appear to hold out the promise of reducing stigma.
3. Incentivizes smoking over injecting
This is essentially the converse of the unintentional incentivization of injecting already
referred to (drivers of injection) whereby focusing services on injectors to the near exclusion of
smokers potentially encourages injecting over smoking. Approximately half of the participants
argued that a benefit of RTI is that it would incentivize smoking over injecting by providing
material incentives to smoke and by preventing agencies from excluding smokers from services.
It would also eliminate barriers (lack of foil and matches, but not necessarily lack of sanctioned
smoking space) to continuing to smoke or transitioning to smoking. As one doctor said:
The big benefit of it [RTI] would be that up to now that I have seen in Kabul and I am
acquainted with the centers, they focus a lot on the injectors. They are given every kind
of services, and the injecting patients are given beds in the winter and they made a
dormitory and everything is made for them, but there isn’t any specific attention to the
smoking patients. If there is more attention to the smoking patients, the injection patients
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would be compelled that they come from injection to smoking because there would be
more facilities for smoking so that their treatment would be easy.
A social worker in the focus group said much the same and claimed to have actually observed
the incentivization of injecting.
In my opinion, it is possible that it [RTI] would attract more, it would persuade them
more to come, because that up to now, for example, I won’t take its name. It was an NGO
which distributed biscuits to injectors, and the ones who were smokers, there wasn’t any
services to them. We witnessed that lots of them come from smoking to injection, so that
they could also get these services.
Concerns about incentivizing injecting are well-founded, for Todd et al. (2009b:116)
report that IDUs themselves stated that one reason for switching from smoking to injecting is
“that IDUs get help from organisations (jackets, soap, shoes) and journalists pay for pictures of
IDUs injecting where non-IDUs do not receive these advantages.” Moreover:
The economic realities associated with less drug needed each day with injecting may
compel current smokers to change in this impoverished environment. These factors
should be considered when implementing policy as preventing initiation of injecting is
one means of harm reduction; this concept . . . needs to be emphasized as the official
policy to groups planning to implement harm reduction . . . . This is particularly
important as harm reduction programmes are seen by some IDU[s] to provide better or
more services to injectors and may unwittingly encourage initiation of injecting. Though
few IDU[s] remarked on this bias as a reason to start injecting, harm reduction service
providers and the government bodies providing oversight must ensure that there is no
bias towards injectors in services received. [Todd et al. 2009b:118]
CONCLUSION
The suffering and hardship that decades of imperial war and geopolitical rivalry have
accomplished in Afghanistan can in no way be adequately addressed by merely implementing an
RTI. One does not show up to a burning house with a glass of water to put the fire out—unless,
of course, one is deluded or a glass of water is all one has. I hope that I am not deluded, and an
RTI is not all that “we” (i.e., the rich nations of the capitalist core) have, as evidenced by the
massive sums of military spending described above. To reiterate: ample resources exist to meet
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the enormous unmet accomplished need in Afghanistan, not the least of which pertains to drug
use and HIV, but the political will and proper balance of power do not. “It is not that ‘we’ are
broke or that we lack options,” as Naomi Klein (2014) says in reference to responding effectively
to climate change, a comment that applies as well to problem drug use. Nevertheless, there are
real, objective constraints on the kinds and scale of HIV interventions that are currently possible
in Kabul and Afghanistan more generally. Illuminating some of those constraints and the
structural factors at the root of problem drug use and HIV infection in Afghanistan, as I have
tried to do here, is intended to contribute to the larger, longer-term task of developing responses
and interventions that are commensurate with the scale of suffering and need. Meanwhile,
immediate needs must be addressed creatively and pragmatically with the resources at hand.
Toward that end, I summarize this study’s findings and make explicit some of their implications.
First, RTI is feasible and poses no harm. The majority of participants stated that RTI
could be implemented in Kabul and that it would cause no harm. Its effects would be entirely
positive, they claimed. To the degree that they are knowledgeable, adequately positioned to make
such an assessment, and wield some degree of policy-influencing power, it would seem that RTI
is feasible and desirable. At the least, with effective education and promotion, stakeholders and
gatekeepers would appear to be potential supporters of and not barriers to RTI. Therefore, it
appears to be a viable concept worth pursuing further. However, it is worth noting that while a
ministerial doctor appears to view harm reduction as enabling, he is an outlier among
participants in his views on harm reduction. Because of his institutional position, however, his
views could have a formidable impact. That is, to the degree that they are representative of those
occupying influential ministerial positions, they could pose a significant barrier to implementing
RTI in Kabul.
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Second, RTI would, according to participants, facilitate treatment. Given the dominance
of abstinence-based approaches to treatment, a particularly persuasive argument for RTI might
be to emphasize its potential (beyond preventing disease, overdose, etc.) to facilitate treatment,
as so many participants do, and to point out that programs are already encouraging injectors to
smoke. One objection to this, however, might be that harm reduction (and by extension RTI) is
not about reducing drug consumption or promoting treatment, which is true. But in a situation
where abstinence-based treatment dominates, OST is not feasible, and an HIV epidemic is
emerging, it may be prudent to promote a harm reduction measure for its potential to facilitate
treatment and thereby increase the chances of its uptake. Such a potential transgression of harm
reduction tenets may be warranted in the case of Afghanistan. After all, pragmatism—if such
apparent transgression of principles may be called that—is a central tenet of harm reduction.
And, as Riley and O’Hare (2000) argue, harm reduction and abstentionism, while certainly not
the same thing, are nevertheless not incompatible. Indeed, harm reduction programs exist that
include a treatment-referral component (Singer et al. 1995).
Third, the positive view of methadone expressed by many participants in the face of the
MCN’s opposition to it recommends cautious optimism regarding the practical implications of
participants’ positive views of and support for RTI and statements affirming its feasibility. All
stakeholders—including drug users themselves17—must support (in practice and not just
rhetorically) a harm reduction program for it to be effective. If drug users do not see it as
beneficial, then they have no reason to participate in it. If police and communities do not support
it, they can and may severely limit its effectiveness. If government or other influential
institutions do not support it, then the program may never even get effectively off the ground—
17

The Client Component of the study suggests that drug users in Kabul would support an RTI (Santelices
n. d.).
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no matter how much scientific evidence and practitioner support for it exists (Pisani 2010; Singer
et al. 2005). The MCN’s repeated obstruction, then, of OST implementation in complete
opposition to the MoPH and WHO support for it should inform all practical inferences from
participants’ support for RTI and positive assessment of its feasibility.
Fourth, a sanctioned place to smoke may be necessary for RTI to be effective. In light of
the stress that many participants place on providing a socially sanctioned space for drug use and
the detrimental effects of police and community harassment, it may be worthwhile to consider
including the provision of a smoking space in a potential RTI program. Without such a
component, offering foil, matches, and encouragement to smoke could prove ineffective. Forms
of tolerance areas have operated and currently operate as effective HIV prevention measures in
other parts of the world. Arguably, precedent for some degree of such a tolerance area exists in
Kabul in the form of the ruined Russian Cultural Center before drug users were evicted from it in
2010.
Fifth, fostering cooperation and disseminating knowledge would be key to an RTI’s
success. That participants emphasize that an RTI program cannot be successful without broadbased cooperation and support from the community and police, without informing them of the
benefits of harm reduction and RTI, and without involving them in planning means that these
issues should be at the forefront of planning for and implementing an RTI. As Stanekzai et al.
(2012) argue, gaining community support for harm reduction is critical for effectively addressing
the spread of HIV among IDUs. Increased advertising about harm reduction services and the
harms of drug use through various media—a need which several participants stressed—might
significantly aid this process. It would certainly benefit drug users and perhaps reduce stigma.

35

Sixth, extensive, effective RTI programming would require a significant increase in
funding and organizational capacity. Given the insufficient funding and organizational capacity
that participants report (and research [e.g., Mercille 2013] and government reports [e.g., MCN
2013] confirm), incorporating an RTI program into already strained organizations would require
robust, stable funding and material supports.
Finally, the insights gained from participants underscores the value of qualitative
methods not just for program evaluation (Singer et al. 1995), but also for feasibility assessment.
We still have much to learn about preventing an explosive HIV epidemic under challenging
circumstances, but it is clear that qualitative research offers an important tool in the ongoing
effort to limit the spread of infectious disease in a world that continues to struggle with both old
and new infectious threats to human health and well-being.
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